1. The Real Predator of the Market Economy: The Legislature
(1) The Primary Enemy Smashing the Producer’s Dream is the Legislature
Up to this point, we have dissected how democracy, massive bureaucracy, and the welfare state collude to plunder the sovereignty of producers and butcher the dynamism of the market. These three operate as a complex triad. However, to avoid confusion, we must clearly identify the primary enemy. To put it bluntly: The arch-enemy of the market producer is the Legislature. Abolish the legislature if possible; paralyze it if not. It is the only way to protect national wealth from legislative overreach. As will be discussed later, bureaucrats dread lawsuits, accountability, audits, and investigations far more than they desire promotions. Particularly, since most countries adopt a career civil service system, their tenure is guaranteed regardless, leading to a low time preference. Therefore, unless Congress or the President provides an ironclad guarantee of protection, bureaucrats will not proactively exercise their discretion.
In other words, Niskanen’s budget-maximizing model applies only to unique, prideful organizations like the U.S. Department of Defense. Most high-ranking officials know they could become the targets of investigation whenever the administration changes, making them highly sensitive to who will bear the responsibility. Conversely, Congress operates under a accountability structure diluted to 1/N. They can use major corporations and public opinion as human shields against criticism, and because they change every four years, they have a very high time preference. Consequently, they aggressively push for legislation, direct bureaucrats, and pressure them to enforce regulations using budgets and organizations as weapons. The decisive evidence supporting my view is the continuous creation of redundant, temporary bodies—such as committees or secretariats directly overseen by Congress or the President—despite the existence of the executive branch. Because bureaucrats dawdle, leadership has no choice but to repeatedly establish these direct hotlines to produce quick results.
Friedrich Hayek, the Nobel laureate in economics, famously stated after visiting Chile under Pinochet’s dictatorship in 1981: “Personally, I prefer a liberal dictator to a democratic government lacking liberalism.” What does this mean? It means that democracy is not a sacred sanctuary. If the “tyranny of the majority” oppresses an individual’s economic freedom—specifically private contracts and property rights—then a dictatorship that guarantees those freedoms is superior. I share this sentiment. Particularly, for the purpose of advancing civilization, private property rights and freedom of expression must be absolute.
Therefore, an authoritarian regime capable of suppressing the predatory instincts of the masses is structurally superior. Of course, authoritarian regimes can also behave predatorily. However, because they are highly visible targets, they easily provide justification for a coup d’état; moreover, they cannot act recklessly because their citizens can simply flee across borders. This explains why political forms other than representative democracy have historically dominated thousands of years of human history.The masses always unite driven solely by envy, anger, and fear. Unless these impulses are restrained by powerful laws, they easily turn into a mob, destroying civilization with their own hands. The notion that the masses possess ‘collective intelligence’ applies only when laws are so stringent that they hold individuals accountable, thereby suppressing their predatory instincts. However, a parliament that supposedly serves the ‘will of the people’ can both create laws and bypass them, ultimately becoming the greatest enemy to the producers who drive the advancement of civilization.
The ‘Value Added’ we discussed in [The Return of Producer Sovereignty] is created exclusively by producers. However, when a democratic state plunders the Parlayer (reinvestment profits) through taxes, shadow taxes, regulations, and inflation, the dream of a better tomorrow becomes an impossibility. Currently, 55% of Korean corporations cannot pay even a single cent in corporate tax, meaning they lack the surplus to reinvest for growth. The state puts them on life support with various loans and subsidies but simultaneously prevents them from actually growing. This is the “democratic government lacking liberalism” that Hayek critiqued. The culprit is the Legislature. The Legislature slaps the producer with its right hand to stunt growth, then applies a measly ointment with its left.
(2) The Era of the Wild: When Dreams Could Become Reality
During the Meiji Restoration in Japan, or the administrations of Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan, and Roh Tae-woo in Korea—it is true that authoritarian executives ignored public sentiment and suppressed the legislature to drive state-led development. Yet, paradoxically, this prevented short-term populism and “moralism” from distorting capital efficiency.
Consider the South Korea of my youth in the 90s and early 2000s. Back then, the government declared a “War on Crime” and purged the thugs who were distorting market prices. While the government laid the foundation for private property rights, it could not interfere in the granular details of market activity.
Why? Because the executive branch, focused on economic growth, and the legislature, waving the banners of human rights and democracy, were too busy fighting each other to engage in dense lawmaking. The initiative for legislation lay with the executive. At the time, the legislature acted as little more than a rubber stamp for the executive’s bills, with almost no independent legislative activity. It was similar to the Singaporean model. Thanks to this, one didn’t have to worry about taxes, regulations, platforms, or rent. It was a legendary era where it was possible to buy a house in Seoul just by running a street food stall—provided you were a good cook.
The Paradox of the 1987 System: Creating an Imperial Legislature to Stop an Imperial Presidency
Following the 1987 constitutional amendment, the initiative in national decision-making shifted from the executive to the legislature. The result was a quantitative explosion of legislation and a subsequent chain-reaction bloat of the executive branch. The President’s power to dissolve the legislature vanished. The outcome was a catastrophe: Infinite Legislation. Once the National Assembly mastered the technique of bypassing judicial rulings through constant lawmaking, the separation of powers in Korea effectively collapsed.
Today, the power of the majority party leader in the legislature overwhelms that of the President or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. For instance, the legislature has neutralized the judiciary by pushing for a four-tier court system, increasing the number of Supreme Court justices, and abolishing the prosecution—and there was no way to stop it. Note how the South Korean National Assembly is destroying the judicial function. Since the executive branch has already been captured by them, only the law—as mentioned above—can restrain the Assembly’s runaway tyranny. The National Assembly acts this way precisely because they know it is the judiciary that stands in their way. The fundamental problem is that the Legislature is an institution inherently incapable of proper lawmaking:
- Slaves to Populism: Their survival depends on popularity contests every four years, making them easy prey for interest group lobbying. Voters mistakenly believe that “a lawmaker who creates many laws is a hard worker,” erroneously judging that adding regulations is better than removing them. This leads to an aggressive legislative bias.
- Zero Expertise: The legislature imposes powerful regulations across comprehensive social and economic sectors despite having zero expertise in those fields. Unlike executive legislation, there is no quality control process—no inter-departmental consultation, no legislative notice, and no review by the Ministry of Government Legislation. A bill can be submitted instantly with the consent of just 10 fellow members. Consequently, they churn out populist bills like low-resolution fodder.
- Zero Accountability: Even when the market is butchered and companies go bankrupt due to excessive regulations and taxes, they take zero responsibility. Even if the nation collapses, they face no consequences.
The numbers speak for themselves. In the 15th National Assembly (1996–2000), there were approximately 1,144 bills. In the 21st (2020–2024), this exploded to 25,847 bills. The 22nd is moving even faster, with 96% of all bills being initiated by lawmakers. In the UK House of Commons, 650 members propose a total of 545 bills over four years. In Korea, lawmakers churn out 30 bills a day. We will dissect this in detail later.
(3) The Infinite Loop of Regulation: Enslaving Youth and Small Business Owners
The ‘Legislative Inflation’ produced by a legislature lacking both expertise and accountability transforms into an even denser net through executive decrees and enforcement rules. Because the legislature holds tools of control like the right to audit state affairs and budget review, the executive is forced into performative over-regulation to avoid political pressure. Market entry barriers solidify into a “Regulatory Everest” that individual producers cannot possibly scale.
The ‘Platform Act’ is a prime example. Under the guise of preventing monopolies by giant platforms, it has effectively turned small business owners into digital sharecroppers. To build an independent e-commerce ecosystem, one must bear the compliance costs of the Electronic Commerce Act, the Electronic Financial Transactions Act, and the Personal Information Protection Act. Small-scale entrepreneurs cannot cross this threshold; thus, monopolies are legally guaranteed by the government. For example, opening a private online mall involves complex PG payment audits under the Specialized Credit Financial Business Act and disclosure obligations under the Labeling and Advertising Act. Global payment solutions like Stripe or PayPal are blocked by Korea’s financial regulatory net and the Foreign Exchange Transactions Act.
This is why giant platform corporations in Korea stake their lives on government lobbying rather than technological innovation. This dense legal mesh acts as an institutional barrier that butchers potential competitors before they can even start. If regulatory barriers were low, niche platforms would emerge and compete by lowering commissions. But today’s “Legislative Omnipotence” traps potential innovators as subordinate cogs in giant corporations.
Even when the executive tries to offer flexible interpretations to foster new industries, it’s common for the market to vanish due to a National Assembly calculating votes. The ‘Anti-Tada (Uber) Law’ was the peak of this. Despite the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport exploring the possibilities of platform mobility, the ruling party succumbed to the pressure of the taxi cartel and butchered the innovative service.
The damage of this ‘Legislative Dictatorship’ is passed directly to the younger generation. Based on perceived unemployment rates, about 60% of university graduates are jobless. Yet, the legislature blocks all paths to self-sufficient survival. For example, if a young person provides a combined tour and driving service for foreign tourists, it’s a violation of Article 34 of the Passenger Transport Service Act—punishable by up to 2 years in prison or a 20 million KRW fine. They become criminals.
Look at the anonymous P2P taxi + tour guide platforms I experienced in Budapest, Hungary. Even former Soviet communist states allow youth to own means of production and act as entrepreneurs. But in Korea, the Legislature leads the way in banning niche markets. At this point, one must ask: Who is the real communist? If jobs are scarce, the territory for individuals to create value must be opened. Instead, the National Assembly is kicking away every ladder. The only choice left for the youth is the fodder of basic livelihood benefits and youth subsidies. In Korea, the birth of a Sovereign Producer is nearly impossible.
The Necessity of Sacrilegious Imagination
I will state the conclusion first: The absence of a legislature is best for the producer. If we must maintain the facade of democracy, the President must have the power to forcefully dissolve or control the legislature. Alternatively, a bicameral system should be employed to ensure internal conflict within the legislature, thereby smashing any monopoly on power. In a state governed by the rule of law, if the legislative body—the very institution holding the power of law—actively dismantles the separation of powers, the free-market economic order is 100% doomed. Individuals dreaming of a better tomorrow will be reduced to slaves. It is no coincidence that the economies of Belgium and Georgia skyrocketed during periods when their parliaments were dormant. Let us now dissect the administrative and historical evidence of why a “Legislative Stampede” butchers the market.
2. Why a Strong Executive is the Lesser Evil than a Strong Legislature
From the perspective of the Austrian School, it is self-evident that both the executive and the legislature are less efficient at resource allocation than the market. The market is a decentralized information processing system based on private contracts and price. Compared to a centralized system like the state, the market achieves optimal capital efficiency at zero cost to the taxpayer. Furthermore, the producer has the incentive to maximize capital efficiency because they personally shoulder the risk of ruin. They do not engage in any activity that fails to create value.
Neither the executive nor the legislative branch can grasp cost information or calculate the economic viability of a project. They are incapable of conducting a comparative analysis of why a project requires a specific element or how much it will cost. They know nothing about the history of costs, nor do they know how to procure items more cheaply. This is because they are not spending their own money, meaning they have no incentive to do so.
In reality, procedures like B/C (Benefit-Cost) analysis or feasibility studies are not conducted by bureaucrats themselves; they are outsourced. Even these outsourcing firms are comprised of private-sector professionals with actual field experience. Furthermore, the public administration professors who provide consultations are clinicians relying on law, political science, business administration, sociology, economics, and statistics—they lack foundational capabilities. Even the attempts in South Korea to establish fields like ‘presidential studies’ or ‘budgetary studies’ have degenerated into gossip surrounding the president’s personal life, holding zero theoretical value. Having majored in public administration during my undergraduate years, I am aware of these realities.
Ideally, the government should guarantee private property rights through strong law enforcement, prevent free-riders who demand wages (rents) exceeding their productivity, and maintain public order. The producers will handle the rest by making better products and competing. Practically speaking, however, if one must choose within a political system, a strong executive is far better for the producer than a legislature-dominant system.
(1) Securing Macro-Consistency and Predictability
A strong executive has the incentive to concentrate resources on national grand tasks such as reconstruction, export-led growth, and infrastructure expansion. A head of state identifies with the “Nation,” not the “Party.” Since the President has the entire nation as their electoral district rather than a specific region or group, they address universal discourses such as the national interest. For example, even President Roh Moo-hyun, regarded as one of the most progressive politicians, made market-oriented and national-interest-first decisions after taking office—such as the KOR-US FTA, the dispatch of troops to Iraq, and the construction of the Jeju Naval Base. He made these calls despite being branded a traitor by his progressive base and risking impeachment. Because the executive seeks to secure governing legitimacy through macro-performance, it does not pour regulations into every corner of niche markets. Instead, it sends a consistent signal: “If you follow the rules set by the state, we will not interfere.” This implicit agreement provides powerful predictability to market participants. Within that gap, a spontaneous “Order of the Wild” emerges.
(2) Special Interest Organizations Are the Enemies of Liberalism
Ludwig von Mises of the Austrian School summarized the core characteristic of liberalism as follows: “Liberalism serves everyone, but represents no special interest.” This principle is rooted in the common-sense reality that private owners of production can survive only when they maximize consumer utility by offering quality products at low prices. Therefore, private property rights and the freedom to dispose of them are not mechanisms designed to generate exclusive profits for capitalists; rather, they serve the interest of society as a whole.
In this regard, Mises sharply points out a fundamental flaw in Marxism: “When Marxists argue that socialism cannot become a reality until the world is ripe for it (…), do they not admit, at least for the present, the social indispensability of private property?” Thus, even Marxism—the greatest enemy of liberalism—inadvertently acknowledges that liberalism maximizes productivity and drives the progress of civilization.
As noted above, a president represents the universal interest because they receive votes from the entire nation as a single constituency, rather than representing a specific party or region. This structure aligns with liberalism. The legislature, however, is fundamentally different. Members of parliament inherently represent special interests, such as their specific districts and political donors. Because their decision-making authority is diluted to a fraction 1/N and governed by party lines that control nominations, they have no incentive to represent the universal interest. Even if national investment and job growth enrich the public, it has no bearing on their reelection. Instead, it is far more politically advantageous for them to visit a bakery and promise to raise bread prices, then turn to wheat farmers and promise to raise wheat prices, cultivating an image of “I am the only one looking out for you.”
People naively assume that lobbyists and corporations are inherently corrupt while legislators are righteous, but the reality is the exact opposite. Because legislators cater to special interests by granting privileges to some and imposing regulations on others, producers have no choice but to line up at parliament with bags of cash. Conversely, civic organizations and labor unions mobilize crowds, lead strikes, and threaten un-seating campaigns, demanding that parliament protect only their specific interests. On this point, Mises asserted that “political parties must view themselves not as representatives of a specific region or social class, but as representatives of the entire nation.” Yet, he deeply worried about European parliaments abusing privileges through protective tariffs, immigration barriers, and welfare policies.
Paradoxically, a legislature can consider the national interest only when its legislative discretion is stripped away. Only when there is no room to represent special interests will the legislature begin to represent the universal interest. James M. Buchanan, a leading figure in Public Choice Theory and a Nobel laureate in Economics, similarly warned that “without constitutional constraints, the state merely degenerates into a predatory machine.” He argued that the legislative discretion of politicians must be amputated by the sword of the Constitution to prevent them from colluding with rent-seekers. If representative democracy becomes antiquated, representing only special interests while destroying labor productivity and driving civilizational decline, it must be dismantled. Politics exists to help people live well; it is absurd that people should become impoverished for the sake of politics.
Why, then, do people still believe that parliament is the champion of justice? To grant a privilege to someone, the beneficiaries must always be a minority, yet the privilege itself must be packaged as if it benefits the majority. Consequently, parliament uses universally appealing pretexts—such as national security, justice, morality, the environment, and welfare—to disrupt market order, grant privileges to specific groups, and demonize dissenters as morally bankrupt. For instance, Korean apples and rice are over five times more expensive than those in Germany. Compared to Georgia, where I reside, apples are ten times more expensive. How is this possible? It is because farmers pressure parliament to effectively ban imports under the guise of “food security.” Funneling state subsidies and consumer money into sectors with low employability and low productivity is a recipe for civilizational decline. Had those funds been utilized for industrial development, they would have generated higher economic growth and more jobs. Yet, parliament utterly fails to represent this universal interest. Mises foresaw this a century ago and wrote in his masterpiece, Liberalism:
“They must rely on ambiguous expressions designed to obscure the true state of affairs. Protectionist parties offer the best example of this kind of equivocation. They always describe the benefits of the protective tariffs they advocate as the interests of a broader group…”
As Frédéric Bastiat once remarked, the masses fixate only on ‘that which is seen’ while failing to grasp the value of ‘that which is not seen.’ Consequently, they look only at the ‘farmers saved by protectionism’ and are deeply moved, thinking, ‘I, too, might receive such help one day, and this is the true greatness of democracy.’ However, they fail to recognize the hidden costs: the opportunity costs of consumers whose real incomes dwindle due to higher prices, the potential value-added that could have been generated through investment, and the suffering of young people enduring unemployment—all of which remain invisible. Instead, such invisible struggles are brushed aside and lumped together as a lack of individual capability.
Even though the public is aware they are paying exorbitant prices, they back down, intimidated by a Rawlsian victim mentality that challenges them: “Would you say the same if you were the farmer?” Alternatively, they are repeatedly deceived by parliamentary trickery involving slogans like “agricultural survival rights” or “national food security.” Frowning, they simply think, “I just won’t eat it,” giving up on demanding the abolition of the legislature—failing to realize that the problem lies with parliament, not the farmers. Finally, as they watch these special interests being fulfilled, they quietly anticipate the day when they too can demand that parliament plunder others to represent their own special interests.
(3) The Legislature’s Fragmented Interests and the Politics of Envy
I am certain that even in a country with a low birth rate and an aging population, if the legislature and the predatory welfare system were removed, elderly entrepreneurs would freely enter the market and sustain economic growth. (For more on this topic, please refer to the following article.) I am witnessing this economic vitality firsthand in such regions. However, the moment the legislature seizes power, the market transforms into a regulatory hell. National economic growth inevitably plummets.
Why? Because a lawmaker holds only a 1/N vote; they are parasitic entities who can do nothing alone. Consequently, they become immersed in the rent-seeking of their constituencies, party members, and interest groups. Since their organizational identity is fragmented—tied to party, region, or interest group rather than the nation—they always have an incentive to divide the public and represent specific factions. At this point, the legislature becomes the HQ of Populism. To complete the narrative that “We protected you through legislation,” they constantly launch new “Regulatory Missiles” while envying the growth of their colleagues. The sight of one member grabbing headlines by churning out laws, seizing party power, and exercising nomination rights triggers unbearable jealousy, turning everyone into law-making machines.
The most critical problem with the legislature is the mismatch between authority and responsibility. The 1/n majority-rule system of the legislature inevitably breeds irresponsibility. While exercising overwhelming legislative power over the entire market and nation, their accountability is diluted to 1/n. When there are 299 lawmakers (as in Korea)—far too many for the governing territory—effectively no one takes responsibility. If there were only ten lawmakers, this legislative stampede would be impossible because public criticism would be direct and unavoidable. Under the guise of “democratization,” increasing the number of people in the legislature or the judiciary inevitably makes irresponsibility the optimal strategy.
Nassim Taleb’s “Silver Rule” (To take someone else’s property, you must put your own at risk) does not exist here. The executive branch has a clear target—the President—who faces political assassination through impeachment or elections if performance fails. The legislature should also be dissolved if national debt explodes, but they hide behind the anonymity of 1/N. There is no chance the legislature will pass laws restricting its own power. Even when the ruling and opposition parties fight to the death, they all agree on increasing their own activity budgets.
All of these issues arise because legislative power exerts a proactive and immediate impact on the entire state and market, whereas the resulting accountability is diluted into 1/N; meanwhile, judicial power operates only ex-post facto and is incapable of blocking them preemptively.
(4) Comparative Analysis: Strong Executive vs. Strong Legislature
| Category | Strong Executive | Strong Legislature |
| Core Incentive | Macro-performance & Governing Legitimacy | Populism & Rent-seeking for Vote Mobilization |
| Market Impact | Consistent Rules (Predictability) | Random Regulatory Bombardment (Market Uncertainty) |
| Accountability | Concentrated Responsibility (Risk of Impeachment/Assassination) | Diluted Responsibility (Hidden behind 1/n Anonymity) |
| Ideological Flexibility | Pragmatism for National Interest | Dogmatic Doctrines for Fandom Politics |
| Constraints on Power | Checked by Legislature & Judiciary (Admin Law/Budget/Audit) | Judiciary & Executive Neutralized via Legislation (No Constraints) |
3. Niskanen’s Fallacy: Bureaucrats are Risk-Averse Survivors, Not Predators
(1) William Niskanen’s Fallacy: Bureaucrats Are Not Risk-Seekers
In his seminal work, Bureaucracy and Representative Government, William Niskanen argued that bureaucrats inflate budgets and organizations to maximize their own power, prestige, and salary. His thesis posits that the bureaucrat’s individual ambition is the root cause of an oversized government.
Niskanen’s argument seems tied to his own experience working at the U.S. Department of Defense. However, because the Pentagon holds the honorable, invincible shield of “national security,” its bureaucrats could pursue risk-seeking organizational expansion and budget maximization. Without such a shield, bureaucrats never act as risk-seekers; they instantly become risk-averse. This tendency is especially pronounced in democratic nations. Knowing they might become targets of investigation by prosecutors or the Board of Audit and Inspection once the administration changes, they refrain from wielding discretionary power. Bureaucrats exercise discretion only when the Ministry of Government Legislation, the National Assembly, the President, or a popularly favored figure provides an ironclad guarantee of protection. While medical malpractice can be covered by insurance, no insurance can protect against lawsuits and public condemnation stemming from policy failures. Consequently, ‘lying low’ becomes the primary principle of bureaucratic behavior.
Even if an organization’s budget is slashed, resulting in restructuring or departmental mergers, bureaucrats do not lose their jobs, as most democracies adopt a career civil service system under the banner of political neutrality. Possessing a low time preference, they look ahead to the next administration, and the one after that, concluding that “doing nothing is the best course of action.” Furthermore, contrary to Niskanen’s assumption, bureaucrats do not even possess actual cost information regarding “how much it truly costs to run a project.” They merely distribute reports whose calculations were responsibly outsourced to research institutes or private firms.
In such a context, questions from prosecutors or inspectors asking, “On what grounds did you make this decision?” pose an existential threat to them. Therefore, they are focused on securing escape routes, making excuses like “We were simply following XX…” or “It wasn’t even XX yet, so it couldn’t be helped.” Considering that bureaucrats even dawdle on national tasks set by their direct superior, the President, while calculating his chances of reelection, the idea that they could overpower Congress through information asymmetry to secure a larger budget is preposterous. They desire promotions without accountability; if told, “We will expand your organization, but your head is on the chopping block if it fails,” they will simply think, “Why bother? It’s not like my salary or honor will increase anyway.” Thus, they enforce regulations within the bounds of protection provided by Congress or the President, hoping to leverage that experience to land jobs in the private sector. After all, they know better than anyone else that they lack practical expertise compared to private-sector professionals.
The moment the executive branch creates a new regulation arbitrarily, without the approval of the National Assembly or the President, the bureaucrat becomes the target of heavy accountability and concentrated civil complaints. They become the prey of National Assembly audits and the Board of Audit and Inspection. They are ‘Risk-Averse Survivors’ who never move first unless there is a guaranteed blame shield provided by the National Assembly or the President.
In addition to these structural reasons, My skepticism toward Niskanen’s hypothesis stems from personal experience. I earned my undergraduate degree at Korea University (KU), an institution that produces a vast number of South Korean bureaucrats. While working part-time in the university’s civil service exam prep room, I observed those who eventually became high-ranking officials. The candidates I witnessed were far from the power-hungry predators described by Niskanen. They were honor-bound, conservative, safety-oriented, and remarkably timid individuals.
People with the temperament of a “wild gambler” do not bet years of their lives on the grueling rote memorization required for the state exams. In reality, among the directors and police officers I know, none possess an ambition for institutional expansion. What they fear most are civil petitions, audits, legislative demands for data, and being summoned for business trips. In fact, as the South Korean National Assembly dismantled the prosecution’s powers and simultaneously increased both the authority and accountability of the police, many high-ranking police officers—overwhelmed by the burden—are resigning. They question, ‘Why on earth should I do this when I could just leverage my experience, graduate from law school, and practice as a criminal defense attorney?‘ Bureaucrats do not desire an expansion of authority when it comes with a matching burden of accountability.
(2) Regulatory Outsourcing and the Forced Expansion of the Executive
The core of my argument is that the true culprit of the regulatory explosion is the Legislature, not the Bureaucracy. The executive branch is the monopoly of violence. It possesses the administrative power to suffocate the market at any time. However, it does not wield that blade recklessly without someone to take the blame. In a nation with a career civil service system where tenure is guaranteed and pensions are secured even if one does nothing, doing something is a net loss.
However, the situation changes when the legislature churns out populist laws and pressures the executive through audits and budget control. Once the National Assembly hands them a shield ensuring complete accountability, from that very moment, bureaucrats engage in a loyalty race, staking their lives on budget and organizational expansion. Niskanen only saw the tail end of this process.
For instance, when creating a bill, the National Assembly leaves all detailed provisions blank and comprehensively delegates authority, effectively issuing a ‘blank check’ with phrases like ‘to be determined by Presidential Decree’ or ‘to be determined by administrative rules.’ In practice, the insertion of such clauses is often done in prior consultation with the executive branch. This allows the National Assembly to take the credit for the initiative, while bureaucrats wield the sword of regulation behind an ironclad shield.
(3) Analysis of the Legislative Stampede
We have identified the primary culprit crushing producers and kicking away the ladders for youth and small business owners. Now, let us confirm their destructive power through data.
The Madness of the Korean National Assembly
| Assembly Term | Period | Bill Proposals (By Lawmakers) | Passing Rate (%) | Key Features & Analysis |
| 11th | 1981-1985 | ~700 | 50.0%+ | Selective & Efficient Executive-led System |
| 16th | 2000-2004 | 2,507 | 37.7% | Stabilization of the ’87 System; Rise of independent bills |
| 20th | 2016-2020 | 24,141 | 13.2% | 62.6% of bills discarded; Performance-driven over-legislation |
| 21st | 2020-2024 | 25,806 | 11.4% (Lowest) | 10x explosion vs 16th; Peak of qualitative decline |
| 22nd | 2024-Present | 12,847 (As of 24.09.23) | – | Avg 26.7 bills per day; Worst legislative gale |
(Source: Google Research, https://www.hankyung.com/article/2025092457671)
Since the 1987 constitutional amendment, the initiative in national governance has shifted from the executive to the National Assembly. As the system stabilized, lawmaker-initiated bills exploded while the passing rate plummeted. The 22nd National Assembly has already reached a level of madness. Before even reaching the midpoint of its term, it has surpassed 50% of the total legislative volume of the 21st. This behavior by the legislature does not allow the executive to follow its instinct of ‘staying still.’ Pressured by the Assembly, the executive branch establishes new statistics, expands investigative personnel, and issues denser regulatory guidelines to prove its reason for existence. The expanded bureaucratic organization then carries out even finer administrative guidance. It falls into a Self-Proliferation Loop of Regulation.
(4) The Fine-Tuning of Decrees and the Spider Web of Regulation
When the National Assembly mass-produces declarative bills, the executive branch sub-divides lower-level laws to an extreme degree under the guise of removing enforcement uncertainty. I call this the “Fine-tuning of Enforcement Decrees.” As of 2026, the regulatory landscape in Korea is as follows:
- Primary Laws: 1,706
- Presidential Decrees: 1,806
- Ordinances: 1,757
- Administrative Rules: ~28,000
- Local Ordinances: 149,000
This spider web acts as invisible iron bars for private economic actors. Large corporations utilize this complex environment as a tool for Regulatory Capture to block competitors from entering. However, for small business owners, each regulation is a direct compliance cost that threatens their very survival.
(5) Platform Subjugation and the Rise of the Parasitic ‘Bureaucratic Translators’
Given that the relationship with platforms is crucial for modern producers, let us examine the role the National Assembly plays regarding this matter. The most fatal consequence of legislative overreach is the extinction of niche platforms. In the post-Soviet countries I traveled—the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Georgia—there are diverse small-scale options like Qartuli, Goodwill, Yandex Go, and grocery-specific platforms, alongside giants like Bolt. The mere existence of “exit options” for small business owners prevents platform exploitation. The strategic ambiguity—the fact that a vendor could move to another platform—stops platforms from recklessly hiking commissions. Instead, they engage in deflationary competition, seeking new niche territories or offering promotions to lower fees. This is true producer-led competition.
Korea is different. Due to the entry barriers created by a legislative stampede, new platforms cannot emerge. With ‘Baedal Minjok’ (Baemin) occupying over 60% of the market, small business owners are forced to endure commission exploitation. They have no choice but to bear the burden of brokerage fees, promotion costs, payment fees, VAT, and delivery expenses. In my experience, selling a 20,000 KRW item results in nearly 60% of the revenue vanishing into the platform. This is why I closed my shop during the pandemic and transitioned to being a delivery rider myself. Consequently, the core departments of Korean platform companies are not R&D, but Government Relations (GR). Innovation is dead; only the evolution of “flag-planting” (promotional algorithms) remains.
In this labyrinth, a new profession has been born: Government Translators. These include policy fund consultants, subsidy brokers, and startup support agencies. They create zero actual value added; they simply profit from lecture fees and commissions under the guise of “deciphering” the government’s language. It is the Legislature that has forced talented individuals, who could have produced superior value, into these parasitic occupations. As the thickness of the law books increases, market innovators vanish, replaced by swindlers and translators.
All of this happens because the legislature has been captured by platforms and Big Tech, tossing poorly crafted, omnibus legislation over to the executive branch with a casual directive to ‘handle it because we will shield you from accountability.’ The executive branch then catches it and churns out enforcement decrees that crush smaller platforms, leaving only the tech giants who can absorb the compliance costs to survive.
If a mega-corporation armed with a cannon and a small business owner holding a kitchen knife were to clash on Amazon, who would emerge victorious? At the very source of this quagmire, where the state casts a net to entrap its own citizens, lies the National Assembly—the supposed representative of the people’s will.
(6) Legislative Absurdities: A Case Study for Global Readers
For global readers, here are a few examples of Korean legislative madness that will make you ask, “Is this for real?”
- The Serious Accidents Punishment Act (SAPA): A law that can send a CEO to prison if an accident occurs at a workplace. It has been expanded to cover all small businesses with 5 or more employees, including local restaurants, bakeries, and cafes. In the event of a fatal accident, the owner faces at least one year in prison; for injuries, up to seven years. While large corporations have legal and safety teams to mitigate this, a small business owner is the management. They become the target of criminal investigation and personal liability. The system has made it more rational to remain a wage-earner or deliberately stunt one’s growth rather than face criminal prosecution. This is a prime example of an entry barrier and a glass ceiling installed simultaneously.
- The Distribution Industry Development Act: Since 2012, the government has banned “dawn delivery” from large supermarkets and forced mandatory Sunday closures, ostensibly to save traditional markets. After over a decade, traditional markets have not been revived. Instead, online platform giants like Coupang and Ali have monopolized the dawn delivery market and achieved explosive growth. As the axis of consumption shifted to the 24-hour convenience of online shopping, large supermarkets faced bankruptcy, and small businesses surrounding them withered due to decreased foot traffic. Everyone is going bust.
- The Anti-Tada (Uber) Law: Globally, Uber and Lyft are common sense. In Korea, they were made illegal. In February 2020, a court ruled that ‘Tada’ (a rental car with a driver service) was legal. Within a month of that ruling, the National Assembly passed an amendment to the Passenger Transport Service Act to block it at the source. Tada, which had 1.7 million users, was shut down. Although the CEO was eventually found not guilty after four years of legal battles, the company was already butchered. At the time, Tada drivers included many unemployed youth, theater actors, aspiring writers, and job seekers. They have now been forced back into dependency on subsidies and basic livelihood benefits.
4. An Idle Legislature is a Blessing for the Market: Georgia’s Rose Revolution
So, what does a world without a legislature look like? There are real-world precedents.
As covered in my field report series, the Georgian government’s Laissez-faire approach actually guarantees the survival of small-scale vendors. If large corporations sell milk and bread too expensively, small business owners bring their homemade products to the street, driving prices down. Consumers compare price and quality directly. Even a 75-year-old can participate in the market as a producer if they have a skill. The key is that this “skill” doesn’t need to be complex engineering—it just needs a comparative advantage. The government creates a market by doing absolutely nothing.
The Rose Revolution of 2003 was the turning point. A corrupt and incompetent government was ousted, and a radical transition to a market economy followed. Immediately after taking office, the Mikheil Saakashvili administration fired all 30,000 traffic police officers—notorious for corruption—overnight. The philosophy was: “If government intervention leads to corruption, dismantle the organization.” Through the Economic Liberty Act, taxes were capped at just six types, and any rate hike was made semi-constitutional, requiring a national referendum. This effectively blocked politicians from plundering market wealth under the guise of welfare. As a result, Georgia consistently ranks at the top of the World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business” index.
When the legislature does not set granular rules, participants resolve conflicts through informal mediation, lowering transaction costs. For example, following the Russia-Ukraine war, niche platforms and agents have spontaneously evolved to bridge language and cultural barriers for incoming digital nomads. I met a young man whose primary job was photography, but he doubled as a real estate agent using his English skills.
In Korea, doing real estate work without a license is illegal; you’d be a criminal. In Georgia, that exam doesn’t even exist. Whoever speaks English well, secures the most listings, and brings in reliable clients wins the market. This massively aids capital accumulation for youth and small-scale startups. The sight of people negotiating construction or food processing jobs on Facebook Marketplace demonstrates how flexible and vibrant the labor market can be when the Legislature does not interfere.
| Category | South Korea (The Butcher) | Georgia (The Wild) |
| Role of Legislature | Drops 26.7 regulations per day (Overworking) | Freeze on regulations; Referendum required for tax hikes |
| Entry Barriers | Dense licensing/certification. Fire/Safety/Labor regs. Difficult to fire. | Freedom to double-job based on talent and reputation. |
| Growth Potential | 30% of profits plundered for insurance/pension. Minimum wage hikes of 7%+. Growth via reinvestment is impossible. | No mandatory insurance. Hiring/firing freedom. No functional minimum wage. Growth via reinvestment is possible. |
| The Youth | Cats waiting for Universal Basic Income and subsidies. | Wild dogs running the market with English, P2P, and IT skills. |
| Economic Performance | Long-term domestic stagnation; Record-high self-employment closures. | Rapid growth of 7–10% per year; Expanding domestic market. |
| National Engine | Giant manufacturing and state-led growth. | Global capital inflow based on Zero-Regulation. |
It is true that Georgia’s laissez-faire policies are partly feasible because of its small population and the absence of a massive manufacturing base. However, the core issue I wish to emphasize is that of ‘vitality.’ Many small business owners and members of the younger generation, who stand in the crosshairs of regulation, cannot afford the compliance costs; consequently, for those unable to enter major corporations, any hope in life is eradicated. Therefore, the South Korean National Assembly’s runaway legislative tyranny can by no means be justified under the pretext of being a manufacturing-centered nation. As discussed in my previous article, trying to foster a massive, state-led manufacturing sector in a small, open economy like South Korea or the United Kingdom is akin to administering steroid injections to a young child. Unless an omnipresent national security threat exists—as seen in Taiwan—democracy will never spontaneously stop crushing the manufacturing sector. Accordingly, the National Assembly must halt its legislative overreach not only in manufacturing but across all industrial sectors. Only then can the younger generation participate in the market as producers and collaborate with specialized mini-platforms, thereby breaking the monopoly of the tech giants.
Surely, Georgia has no giants like Samsung, and its population is one-tenth of Korea’s. Yet, the economic gains of Georgia achieved by the government doing nothing are staggering. While Korean lawmakers pour out 30 laws a day working hard, why does domestic demand face negative growth and the suicide rate remain #1 in the world? Georgia’s feral vitality provides the answer. The producer lives only when the legislature vanishes.
5. What is Real Welfare? A Country Where 75-Year-Olds Must Learn AI
In my field reports from Georgia, I described a specific scene: a 75-year-old woman using the house inherited from her ancestors to run a lodging business. Because there are no suffocating regulations regarding “Airbnbs” or “rental businesses,” she participates in the market as a Producer, utilizing her production means, her hospitality, and her culinary skills—regardless of her age. As long as she possesses a single comparative advantage that others cannot provide, she is matched with a consumer who desires it. The sense of omnipotence from controlling her own life without depending on state subsidies, along with the respect of her family, are added bonuses.
However, a 75-year-old in South Korea cannot run such a business. Instead, the elderly sit in district community centers, learning “How to use AI” from instructors hired with taxpayer money. Why does this absurdity occur? It is because the Legislature’s regulations and taxes are concentrated on the world of Atoms, while being applied relatively loosely to the Bit market. Elderly people with physical assets have no way to participate in the market to earn a living. Thus, we witness the tragicomedy of the elderly attempting to enter the Bit market—where they have zero comparative advantage over the youth—by taking AI classes. Even those trying to learn are a minority; the reality for most is a life of dependency on state subsidies, killing time with nothing to do.
(1) Atom Market vs. Bit Market
| Category | The Atom Market | The Bit Market |
| Core Competency | Cooking, Cleaning, Manufacturing, Hosting | Coding, Streaming, Investing, Gaming |
| Regulatory Intensity | Extreme (HACCP, Fire Safety, Tax Gale) | Relatively Low |
| Participation | All generations (Elderly have an edge in ‘Know-how’) | Biased toward the Youth |
| Social Treatment | “Unlicensed Criminal” or “Petty Vendor” | “Innovator” or “Digital Nomad” |
| Outcome | Abandonment of Self-reliance & Domestication | Capital Monopoly by Young Predators |
The state is highly proficient at controlling physical entities: what we eat, where we sleep, and what we wear. Conversely, it finds it difficult to regulate games, crypto, and personal branding. The problem is that not everyone is born with a talent for the Bit market. Someone is born with the Atom talent to boil a perfect bowl of soup, provide a warm bed, or craft sturdy furniture. Yet, the Legislature has bombed this market with taxes and regulations, shackling growth with entry barriers and glass ceilings.
The reason the bit market is relatively loosely regulated is not because the legislature favors or wishes to nurture it. As discussed in my previous article, the state is inherently clumsy at plundering abstracted, individualized assets. The atom market is heavily targeted because it is visible. Therefore, the freedom enjoyed by the bit market will remain a temporary vacuum as long as the National Assembly exists. In response, the market will once again escape into the realms of quantum mechanics or physical AI. When that happens, we might witness the comical spectacle of senior citizens taking classes on quantum mechanics at local community centers to keep up with regulation.
(2) Turning Masters of Atoms into Beggars of Bits
Those exiled from the Atom market eventually loiter on the fringes of the Bit market, where they lack any comparative advantage. The sight of a grandmother, who is barely familiar with a computer keyboard, taking AI classes and studying Bitcoin is a comedy in itself. The skills she has embodied over decades are the skills of the Atom market: baking bread, caring for children, and providing a room. If the Legislature did not interfere with this market, she would have no need to learn AI. She could simply do what she does best by utilizing her innate talents.
If she bakes excellent bread, the predators of the Bit market will find her. “Grandmother, let me sell this bread for you online.” Will she go bust because of conglomerates? No. Conglomerates value standardization and efficiency; they cannot produce bread or cheese with artisanal depth and flavor. Consumer choice would expand, and prices would drop. All that is needed is to open the market. But when the Legislature suffocates the Atom market, this organic collaboration becomes impossible. The only choice left for her is to receive a basic pension and take AI classes at the district office.
(3) The Arsonist Masked as a Firefighter
What the Legislature is doing is clear: they bomb those with strengths in the Atom market with taxes and regulations, forcing them to migrate to the Bit market. After forcing them to compete in an arena where they are not competitive, the Legislature acts as a benefactor, saying, “We will support your AI education.” They create the problem and then pose as the savior. This is the mechanism by which modern democratic legislatures domesticate their citizens.
Imagine a world where the Legislature vanished. Those with Atom talents would accumulate profit by focusing on what they do best. Those with Bit talents would expand their wealth by collaborating with them. Real welfare for the elderly is not an AI course at a community center. It is the state taking its hands off the market and letting the elderly do what they are actually good at.
6. Next Up: What Exactly is a “Leftist Small Business Owner”?
In my interactions with fellow small business owners, one question keeps me up at night: Why do they support the very leftist democracy that strangles them?
Even Karl Marx, whom leftist theorists worship as a sacred idol, defined the small business owner (the Petit Bourgeoisie) as the most fatal enemy of the communist revolution. In Marx’s eyes, the self-employed were “gray elements”—owning means of production yet being neither giant capitalists nor total proletarians. To him, they were merely a reactionary force that would hinder the revolution to protect their small private properties.
Yet, amazingly, many Korean small business owners experience the direct results of leftist power seizing the legislature—tax hikes, regulatory explosions, surging labor costs, and rising insurance premiums—and still perceive state intervention as “good.” They claim they want policies to revitalize the market, yet believe that this will happen only if lawmakers “work harder.” But as we’ve seen, the market revitalizes itself the moment the National Assembly disappears.
What is the cause of this cognitive dissonance? I diagnose it as the result of long-standing Intellectual Gaslighting. Citizens have been brainwashed by theorists who hide behind the fair-sounding masks of “equality” and “justice.” Keynes, Rawls, Sandel, Piketty. The generation that studied their textbooks and theories now dominates schools, the media, and the arts. From every channel, the message is broadcast 24/7: “The market is dangerous and evil, but the state protects the democratic citizen.” Without a significant shock to the system, it is difficult to perceive this fake world.
In the next article, I will dissect the deception of leftist theorists hiding behind the mask of Moralism.
7. Related Articles
- [The 51% Legal Dictatorship 1] How Democracy Plunders the Productive Class (The Collapse of American Republicanism)
- [The 51% Legal Dictatorship 2] A Geopolitical Autopsy of the Welfare State (U.S, U.K, France, Korea)
- [The 51% Legal Dictatorship 3] From Craftsmanship to Captivity — How the Democratic Caste System Traps the Producer
- [The 51% Legal Dictatorship 4] A “Rigged Democracy” Happy for All, Save for the Growth-Oriented Entrepreneur (Beyond James C. Scott’s “Legibility”)
- [The 51% Legal Dictatorship 5] Making vs. Selling: The Solo Producer’s Exit from the Democratic Millstone
If you enjoyed this article, you can support the project – thank you!